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PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-MAKING

7

THE UN IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Robert D. Kamenshine*
A UN official, commenting on the designation of Swedish
diplomat Gunnar Jarring as the Security Council's representative
to work for a Middle East peace, observed that both Ralph Bunche
and Lester B. Pearson had already received Nobel Prizes for
bringing peace to this region. If anything is to be learned from
the most recent Middle East conflict, it is that a cessation of
hostilities cannot be equated with a peace; that a true peace
involves the resolution of basic conflicts of interests.
Almost from its very inception, the United Nations has been
deeply involved in Middle East problems. Just over twenty years
ago, at the request of Great Britain which was anxious to rid
itself of the burdensome Palestine mandate, the General Assembly
considered the Palestine question. That Assembly passed its
historic resolution of November 29, 1947 supported by both the US
and the USSR, providing for the partition of Palestine into two
sovereign states, one Arab and one Jewish. Successful implementation of partition by the UN proved impossible due to lack of Arab
cooperation, and at midnight on May 14, 1948, the date the British
had set to terminate their mandate, Jewish leaders in Palestine
proclaimed the existence of the new state of Israel.
While both the US and USSR extended recognition, the five
neighboring Arab states formally announced that they would send
forces "to restore order," and full scale war ensued. The UN
made several attempts to bring an end to hostilities, but it was
only by the summer of 1948, after a resolution was passed fiading
a threat to the peace and ordering cessation of hostilities,
that a "lasting" truce came about. By then, Israel had decisively
defeated its Arab neighbors and was in control of more territory
than allocated to it by the UN partition plan. A UN Conciliation
Commission was unable to bring about a final settlement, but by
the following Spring, UN mediator Ralph Bunche was able to arrange
separate armistice agreements between Israel and each of the Arab
states. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),
created to observe and maintain the cease-fire, was to assist the
Mixed Armistice Commissions established by the agreements to
investigate incidents and complaints.
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; B.A., College
of the City of New York; LLB, Columbia Law School; LLM Harvard
Law School
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Although Ralph Bunche received the Nobel Peace Prize for
arranging the Armistices, the peace attained rested on very weak
foundations. The Arab states refused to negotiate directly with
Israel, vigorously denying its existence as a sovereign nation,
(although Israel had been admitted into the UN in the Spring of
1949 with the support of the US and the USSR,)
and maintaining
that the Armistice Agreements had not terminated the state of war.
Israel refused to repatriate the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees, and they remained in camps looking forward to
the day when they might return to their homes, by force if necessary.
In addition, Egypt blockaded the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to
Israeli ships and cargoes.
In May of 1950, Britain, France and the United States attempted
to introduce greater stability into the situation by issuing a
declaration guaranteeing the integrity of the Arab and Israeli
borders. 3 Furthermore, during the Fall of 1951, the Security
Council passed a resolution, 4 on which the USSR abstained,
calling for the cessation of Canal restrictions and declaring that
"neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively belligerent"
and that Egypt's policy was "inconsistent with the objectives of ...
the Armistice Agreement."
Three and a half years later, Egypt having ignored the UN
resolution and continued its blockade, Israel again sought the
Council's assistence. This time, however, a Soviet veto blocked a
resolution calling once more for an end to the restrictions, the USSR
having swung totally to the Arab side.
In addition to blockade, Egypt adopted a policy of engaging
in Fedayeen commando raids on Israel. Resolutions condemning Israel
for breach of Armistice provisions could be passed since the United
States attempted to maintain an even-handed position, but the Soviet
veto blocked similar condemnation of the Arab states.
On October 30, 1956, Israel, having persistently sought a UN
remedy but having found none, took direct action and attacked Egypt to
eliminate the Fedayeen bases in the Sinai, to stop an ominous Egyptian
build-up of Soviet bloc arms, and to end the blockade of Suez and
Aqaba.
Israel asserted that it had acted pursuant to Article 51 of
the Charter which preserves the "inherent right of... self-defense in
an armed attack occurs." There are a number of legal issues raised
by this defense, 5 but it was clear that long-festering grievances
had surfaced after seven years of grace, during which the UN had not
found a lasting solution.

The first step to control the crisis was taken by the United
States, which immediately called for a Security Council meeting to
bring about Israel's withdrawal. The American attitude was
explained by Secretary of State Dulles when he said that, although
the international organization may have been somewhat impotent
"if...whenever a nation feels it has been subjected to injustice,
it should have the right to resort to force in an attempt to
correct that injustice,...we should be tearing this Charter into
shreds.... ,,6 it must be noted, however, that there was a practical
consideration influencing the US moralistic stand. The United States
saw in the accompanying British and French intervention against
Egypt an opportunity to make headway with the "emerging" nations by
dispelling the idea that it was just another colonial power. Thus,
the US stand created the paradox of US-USSR concerted action not
only against Israel, but also against Britain and France, "our
oldest and most trusted allies."
France and Britain defended their intervention as a "police
action" designed to safeguard the Canal and to restore peaceful
conditions, and both expressed willingness to withdraw if the UN
Assembly
would maintain the peace. 7 On November 2, the General
Emergency Special Session passed a US resolution 8 calling for a
ceasefire, withdrawal behind armistice lines, a halt to raids, and
an embargo on shipments of military goods to the area. Lester
Pearson of Canada, sharply criticizing the resolution's failure to
"link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement," proposed a UN force to replace the French and British. Such
a force, Pearson felt, would "keep the borders at peace" pending
a political settlement, while a return to the "status quo" could
lead only to another explosion. The Assembly, following Pearson's
suggestion, requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan for
setting up such a force "with the consent of the nations concerned." 9
Before the cease-fire had gone into effect or the Secretary-General
had delivered his final report, the French and British followed their
air attacks of a few days earlier with landings in Egypt. 1 0 The
Soviet Union, seeking to exploit the awkward US position, proposed to
the Security Council that it and the US be authorized to send joint
military assistance to Egypt to enforce the November 2 Assembly
resolution. US willingness to cooperate With the USSR did not extend
this far, and the proposal never made the Council's agenda. However,
there was agreement in the General Assembly as to the SecretaryGeneral's reports concerning establishment of a United Nations
1 2
Emergency Force (UNEF),I I and the Assembly passed a resolution
creating an Advisory Committee Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia,
India, Norway and Pakistan) to assist the Secretary-General in connection with the Force. The Committee was empowered to request the
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convening of the General Assembly in an emergency situation.
A cease-fire was obtained shortly afterwards. 1 3 Advance elements
of UNEF arrived in Egypt in mid-November, Egypt having accepted the
resolution creating the UNEF command after certain clarifications
provided by the Secretary-General. Although Hammerskjold considered
that there had been sufficient basis for dispatch of the first UNEF
units, he held subsequent talks in Cairo 4 concerning the good faith
obligations of the UN and Egypt as to the presence and functioning
of the Force. An aide-memoire 15 on these talks was submitted to the
Assembly and approved 1 6 on November 24, 1956. British and French
17 and Israeli
withdrawal was completed before the end of the year,
withdraw h from almost all Egyptian territory was accomplished in
January.
UNEF replaced the British, French and Israeli forces
as they pulled out, until the Force stood at the Egyptian-Israeli
Armistice Line running the length of the Sinai.
19
Israel refused to pull out of Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh,
in
response to US, USSR and UN pressures, without obtaining some of
what it had fought for. The US and the USSR shared the UN position
that no compromise could be made with or guarantees extended to
Israel in advance of its total withdrawal, since to do otherwise would
be tantamount to condoning "a change in the status juris resulting
from military action contrary to the Charter."
It was evident,
therefore, that some reconciliation between principle and reality
had to be found. The answer was contained in two resolutions passed
on February 2, 1957.20 The first satisfied principle by requesting
withdrawal "without further delay," while the second held out the
promise to Israel that withdrawal would be followed by action "toward
the creation of peaceful conditions." After withdrawal had been
completed, the Emergency Force was to patrol the Armistice Line in
order to maintain the Armistice Agreement, and was to be stationed
at Sharm-el-Sheikh. 2 1 Several days later, the Secretary-General
announced that he had received assurance from Egypt that it would be
guided by the Assembly's resolutions.
In addition to Assembly attempts to speed final withdrawal,
the United States, recognizing the depth of Israeli concern over
use of Aqaba, declared that it would exercise the right of innocent
passage through the Straits of Tiran and would join with other
maritime powers to secure general recognition of this right.
On March 1, almost five months after its initial attack, Israel
announced plans to leave Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh. 2 2 This step
was taken in the belief that the doctrine of innocent passage had
received sufficient support; and as a result of certain assumptions
which Israel made concerning the role of UNEF. Israel believed the
function of the Force at the Straits of Tiran and in Gaza would be
to assure non-belligerency and to administer Gaza "until there is
a peace settlement." Perhaps even more important, as to possible
UNEF withdrawal before a peace settlement was reached, Mrs. Golda
-19-

Meir, Foreign Minister of Israel, noted Hammarskjold's assurance
that a withdrawal request would be referred to the Advisory Committee.
Israel assumed that this virtually assured a call for Assembly
consideration, and felt there would be a lapse of time in which the
UN would prevent hasty action leading to a renewal of hostilities.
With Israeli withdrawal in 1957 from occupied territory, peace
of a kind was brought to the Middle East once more, and another
Nobel Peace Prize awarded, this time to Lester Pearson for proposing
UNEF. However, while Article 2(4) of the UN Charter relating to
respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of
member states had been implemented, no direct steps had been taken
to fulfill Article 2(3) relating to peaceful settlement of international disputes. Nothing had really been solved.
Beginning in May 1967, Israel warned Syria of strong reprisals
in response to a series of Syrian El Fatah commando raids reminiscent
of the 1955-56 Fedayeen attacks. Syria reacted to these warnings
by moving large fbrces to its border and by calling for Egyptian
assistance under a 1966 mutual defense pact. President Nasser in
turn quickly mobilized his forces and sent major contingents toward
the Egypt-Israeli Armistice Line, The question of UNEF presence
was raised by 4he UAR on May 16,23 and by May 18, pursuant to a
formal UAR request, Secretary-General U Thant ordered the Force's
complete withdrawal. 24 By the end of that week, Israel began
mobilization. U Thant flew to Cairo, and while en route learned
that Egypt had reimposed the Aqaba blockade against Israeli shipping.
He returned to New York with an Egyptian assurance that it would not
begin the hostilities, and his report asked that there be a "breathing spell" between the parties to allow tensions to subside and to
permit the Security Council to deal with the problem. The Council
held five meetings between May 24 and May 31, and met again on June 3,
to consider what the Secretary-General had characterized as "the
extremely grave situation in the Middle East," but passed no resolution.
On June 5, full scale fighting erupted. The Security Council
was convened in emergency session 6and a day later passed a resolution for an immediate cease-fire.
For the third time since the
formation of the state of Israel, the United Nations had been unable
to avert major warfare in the area. Also for the third time, the
cease-fires between Israel and its major opponents were not effectuated until Israel had decisively defeated its enemies. This time,
Israel occupied Sinai, regained control of the entrance to the
Gulf of Aqaba, captured the West band of the Jordan and the Syrian
Heights.
From mid-June through mid-September the General Assembly took
no meaningful overall action designed to bring about a lasting solution in the Middle East. Meeting during this period, the Fifth
-20-

Emergency Special Session of the Assembly, called at the request of
the USSR 27 passed separate resolutions dealing with measures taken
by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem 2 8 and dealing with the
plight of the refugees. 2 9 The session terminated its work with an
expression of "utmost concern" about the Middle East, and placed
the problem on the agenda of the Twenty-Second Regular General
Assembly convening on September 19, 1967, which did not take any
meaningful steps.
Six months after the latest Middle East crisis, on November 22,
1967, the Security Council made the first attempt to deal with the
overall problem with the passage of a British-sponsored resolution.30
The unanimous vote called for the Secretary-General to designate a
representative (Gunnar Jarring)31 "to establish and maintain contacts
with the states of the Middle East in orde'r to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." Emphasizing "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war," the need for a "just and lasting peace," and the commitment
of UN members under Article 2 of the Charter, the resolution offered
elements to satisfy all participants. These were:
1. withdrawal of Israeli armed forces;
2. termination of belligerency, and recognition of territorial
integrity and political sovereignty of all states in the
area;
3. guarantee of freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
4. settlement of the refugee problem;
5. guarantee of territorial integrity and political independenc(
through such measures as demiliterized zones.

Having sketched the UN's role to date, what evaluation may be
made of its peace-keeping effort and its prospects as a peace-maker?
UNEF has represented the UN's most ambitious peace-keeping attempt
in the Middle East, and it is in this light that its withdrawal in
May 1967, assumes such importance. It is therefore necessary to
consider whether its stay could and should have been prolonged.
Clearly UNEF, which at its peak was 6,000 strong and which in
May 1967, amounted to a total of 3,400 lightly armed men, only
1,800 of which were available to patrol the approximately 170
mile line, never was intended to deter major military action from
either side by force. Rather, it was to stop raids, prevent incidents, and provide a psychological barrier to large-scale aggression.
-21-

U Thant, on June 26, 1967, gave the Assembly a detailed account
of legal and practical considerations which governed his actions in
ordering UNEF's withdrawal. 3 3 The basic premise of the SecretaryGeneral's legal position is that UNEF was stationed in Egypt with
the consent of the Egyptian Government. With this there can be no
disagreement. The main subjects of controversy center on what
limitations the Egyptian Government:had agreed to place on its
sovereign right to make the Force's withdraw, and on the procedures
U Thant followed in ordering removal.
The UAR and the UN had been committed through the aide-memoire
of November 20, 195634 to exercise good faith as to the presence
and functioning of UNEF in the completion of its "task". 5 The
"task" was that defined by General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I)
of November 5, 1956 setting up the UNEF command. UNEF was to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities
in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly
Resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.
U Thant's contention is that the emphasis of the November 5 resolution was merely on obtaining cessation of hostilities, and therefore
that the November 20 good faith aide-memoire is inapplicable to the
"task of serving as a buffer and deterring infiltrators," as defined
in the resolution of February 2, 1957. He de-emphasizes the fact
that securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities was to
be accomplished in accordance with "all" the terms of the broad
November 2 resolution which encompassed not only cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, halt of arms shipments and reopening of Suez,
but cessation of raids and scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice
Agreement. While U Thant's interpretation is a possible one, it
is difficult to see why it should have been adopted in view of Dag
Hammarskjold's interpretations and Egypt's acceptance of the "newer"
roles for the Force.
In his first report on the plan for UNEF, 3 6 Hammarskjold had
recognized that there would be two stages in the functioning of the
Force. The first was to coincide with the stage contemplated by a
November 4 Assembly resolution 3 7 directing the Secretary-General
to arrange a cease-fire, withdrawal and a halt to arms shipments,
but not mentioning the issue of raids, and the second was to "correspond to a period where the functions would be of a somewhat different nature, and should be viewed in light38of efforts over a
longer range." His second and final report
indicated that the
Force's functions "when a cease-fire is being established (were)
to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of nonEgyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms
established in the resolution of 2 November 1956."
The phrase
"when a cease-fire is being established" to which U Thant gives
some importance, seems to have included a longer period than that
required for a technical cease-fire to be effectuated, since Hammar-22-

skjold refers to the Force's presence "after" withdrawal of foreign
troops. At any rate, in discussing the size of the Force, Hammerskjold recalled the two-stage work of the Force mentioned in his first
report, and said that although the size of the force would probably
require some adjustment, the "somewhat different tasks" referred to
in his first report would be "within the framework" of the November
2 resolution.
In view of the Secretary-General's 1956 reports on UNEF, it is
reasonable to interpret the good faith aide-memoire as encompassing
any functions agreed to which were fairly within the scope of the
November 2 resolution. The resolution of February 2, 1957 dealt
with the functions to be carried out by the Force over a long range
period and thus required new Egyptian consent, but the tasks actually
performed of preventing raids and acting as a buffer meet the test
just posited.
Secretary-General Hammarskjold never made any distinction as
to the application of the good-faith agreement to later functions.
In his February 11 report39 in seeking to persuade Israel to withdraw from Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh, he stated that he understood
the A',sembly to consider the February 2 resolution a "formal undertaking" for the post-withdrawal stage. This was "particularly so"
"since the United Nations Force is deployed in the region with an
assurance from the Government of Egypt that the Government, when
exercising its sovereign rights, on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, will be guided in good faith by its
acceptance of the basic General Assembly resolution of 5 November
1956 concerning the Force and its functions." Similarly, his discussion of the good-faith agreement in his report of October 195840
on the overall experience derived from the functioning of UNEF revealed no such dichotomy. Surely, such an important distinction
would have been noted. Furthermore, no statement of the Egyptian
Government ever evinced any indication that it did not see itself
bound by the good faith declaration in regard to the presence of the
Force on the Armistice Line or at Sharm-el-Sheikh. Thus, six days
after the February 2 resolution had been passed, the letter 4 1 by the
Egyptian Foreign Minister indicating Egyptian acceptance of the
status of forces agreement governing UNEF specifically refered to
the good faith declaration.
U Thant makes the further point that since Israel refused to
consent to the stationing of troops on its side of the Line as
called for by the February 2 resolution while Egypt did, it would
be inappropriate to limit Egypt's rights to request withdrawal.
Regardless of what view one takes of Israel's position, Egypt by
allowing troops to be stationed on its side of the Line, did undertake certain responsibilities.
Even assuming that the good faith agreement of November 20, 1956
did not specifically encompass the functions of the Force performed
as of May 1967, it seems unthinkable that the UN would have consented,
-23-

or that Egypt could have thought that the UN was agreeing, to carry
on its most recent functions without an understanding that Egypt
would be acting in good faith. There had to be an implicit extension of the obligation to act in good faith to cover these long
range tasks. One wonders why on May 17 of this past year U Thant
deemed it necessary to remind the Egyptian Government of the provisions of the good faith accord if he did not accept this position
himself.
Assuming, therefore, that there was a mutual obligation of
good faith extending to the most recent presence of UNEF, there
remains the question of the meaning of this obligation. Since the
public good faith aide-memoire of November 20, 1956 between Egypt
and the UN had been intentionally vague as to definition of the
obligation in order to save face for Egypt, Hammarskjold had felt
it necessary to provide some clarification on the subject, by setting out the actual terms of his discussion with President Nasser
in a private aide-memoire of August 5, 1957, 4 2 a copy of which was
deposited in unofficial UN files. According to Hammarskjold, Egypt
had agreed to limit its sovereignty in the matter of withdrawal to
the extent that both it and the General Assembly would have to agree
that UNEF had completed'its task before it could be removed. U
Thant deemed this account irrelevant, since it was not an official
UN document, and was unkown to the Assembly, the Advisory Committee
or Egypt. He therefore concluded that the legal basis for the presence of UNEF in Egypt as set forth in official documents was not
affected by this private memorandum. It is clear, however, that
since the memorandum had been available to the Secretary-General,
it had been intended as a guide for him in the handling of future
disputes on the presence of the Force.
Even if one completely disregards the private aide-memoire,
there remains the statement in Hammarskjold's October 1958 report 4 3
on the experience of UNEF 0 which hints at the contents of the
unofficial memorandum:
...were either side to act unilaterally in

refusing continued presence or deciding on withdrawal, and were the other side to find that such
action was contrary to a good faith interpretation
of the purposes of the operation, an exchange of
views would be called for towards harmonizing the
44
positions.
U Thant's report nowhere mentions this official interpretation by
Secretary-General Hammarskjold of the good faith obligation.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue concerning the SecretaryGeneral's actions in May 1967, is whether he alone had the power to
make the decision that the Forces be withdrawn. The Assembly
resolution establishing the Advisory Committee provided that the
-24-

Secretary-General was authorized "to issue all regulations and
instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of
the Force, following consultations with the Committee..., and to
45
take all other necessary administrative and executive action."
While the Secretary-General was more of a free agent than in the
Congo and Cyprus peace-keeping operations where he had to report
periodically to the Security Council, it is questionable whether
his broad mandate for executive discretion in implementing the
Assembly's resolutions included terminating the Force's existence
without General Assembly approval. This is particularly so since
the Force was deemed to be a subsidiary organ of the Assembly. 4 61t
may be said that the Advisory Committee, which the Secretary-General
consulted on May 18, could act for the Assembly and that its decision
not to call the larger body represented tacit approval of the Secretary-General's withdrawal order, thus making a resolution unnecessary. It is not clear, however, that by giving the Advisory
Committee the right to request its convening and to assist the
Secretary-General in his duties with UNEF, the General Assembly had
delegated its power to make such a fundamental decision as that
relating to termination of the Force's presence.
Even assuming that technically, the Secretary-General had
power to withdraw UNEF without a General Assembly resolution, U Thant
justifies his decision to consult only the Advisory Committee, not
only because he felt he had thereby fulfilled his obligations of
consultation and because Hammarskjold had noted this would be "an
indicated procedure" for consultations, but because certain procedural
obstacles prevented recourse to the Assembly.
U Thant has said that it was unlikely that the Assembly could
have considered the matter since:
1.)

the next regular session was some four months off;

2.)

the special session of the Assembly meeting at the time
would have had to add the item to its agenda through an
unlikely two-thirds vote;

3.)

a special emergency session of the Assembly called under
the Uniting for Peace resolution47could not be convened
since the issue had not been presented to the Security
Council and thus the lack of Council unanimity required
to call such an emergency session did not exist.

It would seem, however, that several approaches remained for bringing the problem to world attention. As to the Assembly, while the
two-thirds vote48needed to add to the existing agenda of the special
session may have been unattainable, there were other possibilities.
The special session of the ASsembly then in progress had on its
agenda "a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects" and the issue of withdrawal
-25-

might have been discussed under this item without the necessity for
any procedural steps. Even if this had proved unfeasible, the item
of peace-keeping operations could have been amended by a majority
vote49so as to permit consideration. Finally, a majority of members
could have called for a Sixth Special Session, 5 0 and since such
sessions are to be held within fifteen days? 1 this would have provided much-needed time to allow private negotiations considerable
play. As to the Security Council, which is deemed to be always in
session, the Secretary-General could have called its attention to
the proposed withdrawal as a "matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" 5 2 and possibly have paved the way for an emergency session of the Assembly.
The Secretary-General, however, felt there would have been no
point in bringing the issue to either the Assembly or the Security
Council, since neither organ probably would have been able to reach
an early decision. In support of this position, he pointed out that
a report on withdrawal characterizing the situation created as
"extremely menacing" had been submitted by him to the Council on
May 19, 53yet it had not even met until May 24 and then had taken no
action. Furthermore, he believed that had a-c uick decision been
reached, it could have been none other than withdrawal once Egypt
had withdrawn consent.
Criticism of U Thant's failure to consult these bodies has been
primarily based on the usefulness of such consultations for delay
during which pressures for reversal of the withdrawal request by
Egypt couid have been applied privately. The principal point made
by U Thant as to delay, however, is that as of May 18, Egyptian
army units had moved up to the Line and into Sharm-el-Sheikh, and
"effectiveness as a buffer and as a presence had already
thus UNEF's
,5 4
vanished.
The problem with U Thant's considerations is that they relate
to the situation as it stood on May 18 rather than May 16, and thus
he ignores the crucial issue of tactics. 5 5 On May 16 at 5:30 p.m.,
U Thant received a cable from the UNEF commander informing him of
the UAR's request for withdrawal of "all UN troops which install
OPs along our borders." It was only a little over an hour before
the UAR's permanent representative was informed that even a request
for temporary pullback would have to be considered as a request to
remove all the troops, and that Egypt had merely to officially request withdrawal from the Secretary-General to obtain it. 5 6 No
mention was made of the necessity for consulting the Advisory Committee or any other UN organ prior to ordering withdrawal, nor was
there any appeal for restraint or reference to the good faith accord.
Egypt clearly felt it had been given an open, unqualified invitation
to compel withdrawal. On May 17, approximately 24 hours later, and
after some Egyptian forces had moved up to the Line 0 the SecretaryGeneral held his first and informal consultations with the representatives of nations supplying contingents to the Force. Their
-26-

opinion on action was divided. The Canadians, supported by Denmark
and Brazil, argued that there should be an appeal to Egypt prior to
receipt of a formal request and that the Assembly should be informed
immediately of the situation. The Yugoslav and Indian representatives
on the other hand concurred in the Secretary's view that there w-as no
choice but to comply, and even said that, regardless of what the Assembly might decide, the decision
was up to the Secretary-General
since
'
57
he had negotiated the agreement to station UNEF.
Approximately two
hours after these consultations U Thant presented two aide-memoires
to the UAR representative, 58 the first reiterating his May 16 statement adding that continued presence of Egyptian forces on the Line would
also compel withdrawal, and the second quoting without comment the
good-faith accord of November 20, 1956. The official withdrawal message
from the UAR was received by U Thant at 12:00 P.M. on May 18. On
receipt of this official request, the UNEF Advisory Committee was
officially convened. 5 9
By his initial reply of the 16th, the Secretary-General himself
had frozen the UN course of action leaving no room for diplomatic
maneuvering. While recognizing Egypt's right to make the request,
he could have equivocated on his power to give a definite reply because
of the need for consultations and the gravity of the situation which
would result from withdrawal. U Thant's communications with Egypt,
though referring on May 17 to the good-faith aide-membire of November
20, 1956, on the whole stressed Egypt's rights rather than its duties.
4e emphasized the right of the Egyptian troops to move up to the Line
rather than taking the position that since effective functioning of the
Force necessitated the maintenance by the Egyptian troops of a certain
distance from the Line, there was a good faith obligation to do so at
least until the withdrawal request had been proved.
What thus remains very questionable is the course U Thant pursued
on May 16 prior to the official request by the UAR on May 18.
It is
conceivable that, while U Thant believed Egypt had the right to request
withdrawal and the UN the obligation to fulfill such a request, he
perhaps also assumed that Nassar did not really wish the Force withdrawn. He, therefore, may have couched his initial communication in
such final terms that Nasser would view his statement as a threat of
withdrawal and would be induced to continued cooperation. After all,
it was only on May 18 when the actual request was received that U
Thant decided to appeal to Nasser to reconsider, and by then it was too
late. Seen in this light, the arguments presented in the SecretaryGeneral's report of June 26, 1967 can be viewed as afterthoughts, although
of course, they still must be evaluated on their own merits. What
U Thant may not have accounted for, was that while Egypt may have
wanted to show its strength to its allies, particularly Syria, by
requesting some sort of withdrawal, it did not really expect to obtain it.
-27-

Confronted with a "dare", Egypt had to follow through to save face.
U Thant, as a general defense, emphasizes that UNEF withdrawal
was not a primary cause of the present crisis, since the Force merely
had "immobilized and covered up" the basic Arab-Israeli conflict.
While it is correct that the Force did not bring about peace-making,
the report does not deal with the issue of the withdrawal's impact
on ending a keeping of the peace. The removal of this psychological
barrier added to an already deteriorating situation, and made any
effort to reverse the trend far more difficult for all concerned.
Thus, even though Egypt may have been physically able to reimpose the
Aqaba blockade as of the 18th when its forces moved into Sharmel-Sheikh, it did not do so until after the functioning of UNEF had
been officially terminated, and while U Thant was taking his futile
trip to Cairo.
The record of United Nations peace-keeping efforts in the Middle
East is mixed. The UN has to its credit the Armistice Agreements
concluded in 1949. On the other hand, the calls for cessation of
hostilities in the three major wars have been effective only after the
outcome of the fighting has all but been decided. However, relatively
early calls for cease-fires may have accelerated the cessation of
hostilities, saving face for the losing side by bringing world opinion
to bear on the protagonists.

In the most recent conflict, the call

for a cease-fire may have prevented the deterioration of the conflagration to the point where the superpowers and other nations would have
had to intervene and thus, a larger war may have averted. Though the
leaders of the superpowers were in direct contact over the Hot Line,
the UN provided an additional means of communication and a mechanism for
cooperation. As for UNEF, it was very effective over its ten year
tenure on the Line as a buffer and barrier to infiltration, but the
UN, through the Secretary-General, did not take full advantage of its
potential as a psychological restraining force to major conflict. It
must be recognized, however, that no force such as UNEF was maintained
on the Syrian or Jordanian Lines, since UNEF had come to be stationed
in Egypt only because of the presence on Egyptian soil of the troops
of Israel, France and Britain which Egypt was desperately anxious to
expel. The UNTSO observers functioned along the Jordanian and Syrian
lines to investigate incidents and were successful in arranging on-thespot cease-fires and in providing information for possible UN action.
It will be remembered, however, that it was a series of incidents on
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the Syrian border that started the course of events leading to the outbreak of war in 1967. Of course, even if UNEF-type forces had been stationed on all Lines, there still would have been the potential for air
incidents or full scale attacks, and it is this form of warfare which
has proved decisive in the Middle East. Furthermore, the problem of
withdrawal of consent would have remained, as with the UNEF forces stationed in Egypt. Today, the UN's peace-keeping efforts in the Mid-East
are confined to an augmented force of truce observers to keep the Council
informed of developments. As in the past, resolutions condemning and
calling for a cessation of cease-fire violations, though speaking largely
after the fact, may be of some value in influencing world opinion and
to some extent the parties' future conduct.
Some twenty years of UN involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict
has brought it no closer to a peaceful solution. While peace-keeping
efforts have enjoyed some measure of success, the mere keeping of the
peace has not served to make it. The intensity of feelings and the
vital interests at stake have made it extremely unlikely that, as some
may have supposed, the status quo which the UN attempted to preserve
would harden into a permanent settlement. It may well be that peacekeeping impedes rather than assists final settlement by the parties to
the conflict by removing the urgenc and necessity for direct negotiations
This effect is created by lulling
which normally would be operative. 6
the parties and the rest of the world into a false sense of security.
However, the pattern of United Nations action in the 1967 crisis
has differed dramatically from that of 1956. Contrary to the 1956
precedent, the cease-fire resolutions of this past June did not couple
a call for a halt to hostilities with one for withdrawal to the 1949
Armistice Lines. Withdrawal now has been viewed as one of the elements
of an overall settlement rather than as a precondition to be fulfilled
before other problems can be approached. The UN, though still engaging
in peace-keeping through truce observers, has now shifted its focus
through the November 22, 1967 Council resolution to solving the basic
Arab-Israeli conflict, as originally suggested eleven years earlier
by Lester Pearson. This approach is clearly more constructive.
While no one can forcast the outcome of the Jarring mission with
complete certainty, an attitude of skepticism as to its potential for
success surely is justified. The resolution serving as his mandate is
a catalogue of longstanding and deeply troublesome problems serving to
make clear, as U Thant observed on May 19, that "UNEF allowed us for
ten years to ignore some of the hard realities of the present conflict."
The substantive issues in the dispute - refugees, Suez, Aqaba, Sinai,
etc. - are indeed difficult, but the root of the Middle East problem
lies in overriding emotional factors. There is Arab resentment of the
Jews as European intruders with their Western culture and advanced
technology, and hurt pride over Arab inferiority after a history rich
in achievement. The Arab inability to accept Israel as a fact of life
and to enter into a mutually satisfactory adjustment of interests is
central to the area's problem.
-29-

Unlike 1956, there has been at least some indication on the part
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of the Arab states of willingness to make constructive proposals
To date, however, these have fallen far short of anything Israel might
accept principally because they do not include a directly negotiated
peace settlement involving recognition. Public opinion, with which any
government must cope, has not been prepared to accept a settlement.
Furthermore, President Nasser for one is compelled to take a mi.litant
stand because of his rivalry with other, perhaps more militant, Arab
heads of state for leadership of the Arab world. Thus, the Cairo
newspaper, Al Ahram, considered to be an unofficial spokesman for
President Nasser, stated only recently that the Jarring mission was
"almost foredoomed to failure" but that it served to create a "breathin
space" in which to prepare for "an Arab action to correct, at the least,
the consequences of the six day war."16 2 The Arab Summit Conference,
scheduled to meet January 19 in Rabat, seems no more likely to resolve
differences between the moderate and extreme factions than has any
prior conference. At the same time, there are, of course, differences
of opinion within the Israeli war coalition government, but the Israeli
people are strongly against territorial or other concessions absent a
complete settlement. 6 3 Thus, a final settlement can result only from
overwhelming necessity created by a number of internal and external
factors operating on both sides, Among the most critical of these is
the policy pursued by the US and the USSR.
One of the realities of the current international scene is the
supreme importance attached by each superpower to avoiding direct
confrontations, such as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis, with
their attendant risk of all-out nuclear war, The balance of terror
between these two powers has compelled the development of a system of
informal relationships, understanding, and quick communication
independent of traditional international law and superimposed on the
functioning of the UN and the relationships of all other powers. It
appears that though the Soviet Union had inflated Arab confidence with
its vigorous statements of support and had approved the massing of UAR
troops, it did not seek war in June, 1967. Thus, it has been reported
that it had no knowledge of the UAR's plans to seek the UNEF pullback
or to reimpose the Aqaba blockade, and that immediately after UNEF's
withdrawal, the US and USSR agreed over the Hot Line to attempt to
persuade Israel and the Arab states, respectively, to exercise restraint
While the superpowers were not successful, the day the Middle East war
began the Soviet Union communicated over the Hot Line its desire for a
cease-fire and for avoidance of a conflict with the US. The US likewisE
assured the USSR of its intention not to become involved, although it
rejected the withdrawal aspect of the cease-fire proposal. 6 4 Once the
Arab defeat became obgious, the USSR abandoned its efforts to couple a
cease-fire with a request for withdrawal and, to the dismay of its Arab
friends, joined the US on June 6 in voting for a simple cease-fire
resolution. During the course of the war, the Arabs began to contend
that US and British aircraft had assisted Israel. The US took great
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pains to assure the USSR that it was in no way involved to the extent
of offering at the June 6 Council meeting to allow UN observers on
Sixth Fleet carriers who could inspect their logs and interview their
pilots. When US aircraft took off to assist the USS Liberty which
had accidentally come under Israeli attack, a message was sent to the
Soviet Union, so that it would be alerted to the purpose of the
flights. 6 5 The Soviet Union in turn never joined in the Arab charges
at the UN or reported these charges in its news media. There were
altogether approximately a dozen Hot Line communications during the
crisis in addition to other forms of consultation, showing, as the
Algerian daily El Moudjahed stated, that the balance of terror had
caused the USSR "to put the preservation of peace above every other
consideration."
Given this mutual desire on the part of the US and the USSR to
cooperate in avoiding embroilment in conflicts, there remains the
question of whether this can have any direct bearing on the potential
for a peace settlement in the Middle East. Though the Soviet Union
has consistently sided with the Arab states to obtain UN condemnations
of Israel's Armistice violations, it cannot be overlooked that it
recognized Israel at its inception, voted for its entry into the UN
and, unlike the Arabs, recognizes Israel's continued right to exist
as a sovereign state. Just before the recess of the General Assembly's
Emergency Session on July 21, the US and the USSR worked out a compromise resolution which, though calling for withdrawal by Israel,
stated that "all member states in the area" are expected to acknowledge "that each of them enjoys the right to maintain an independent
national existence of its own and to live in peace and security."
Strong Arab opposition, principally from Algeria, prevented this compromise resolution from being offered to the Assembly. Recently, a
meeting of foreign ministers of the USSR and of the Eastern European
nations, other than Albania, issued a communique which, although
stating that Israeli withdrawal "is the main and basic condition for
the restoration and preservation of the peace in the Middle East,"
went on to note "the necessity of all member states in the Middle East
to recognize the right of each of them to an existence as an independent
national state in conditions of peace and security." The USSR therefore
recognizes that it would be politically impossible for the US to permit
Israel's destruction.
In addition to mutual agreement on the reality of Israel's
existence, there is the mutual fear of a possible regional nuclear
conflict which could ultimately engulf the superpowers. Unless a
basis for a lasting peace is found, there exists a distinct possibility
that future Arab-Israeli conflicts might involve the use of nuclear
weapons. Israel is believed to be working on them and undoubtedly has
the technical capacity to bring about their successful development. The
UAR, with the help of foreign scientists, might be similarly successful.
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Also, with the recent development of nuclear capability by Communist
China0 that nation might seek to increase its influence in the Middle
East by supplying such weapons to the Arabs. While the possession of
formidable nuclear weapons by the US and;the USSR has tended to give
rise to the degree of stability in their relations previously discussed, there is no reason to assume that the Middle Eastern nations
would demonstrate a similar sense of responsibility. The potential
of a nuclear war in the Middle East in which the superpowers might
become involved may provide an impetus for them to pressure both sides
to reach a settlement. It has been argued, however, that the USSR's
rearming of Egypt and Syria with ultra-modern weapons as well as the
offer to assist Jordan reflects an unwillingness to cooperate. This
does not take into account the Soviet desire to retain and expand its
recently acquired influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, a traditional
focus of Russian ambition since the czarist era. Furthermore, the
Soviets must save face with their Arab friends after having failed to
intervene in the conflict and having let them down to some extent in
the diplomatic arena. It must be noted that there is a certain usefulness in restoring the military balance of power in the area and
thus soothing the Arab states' pride sufficiently to enable them to
make meaningful concessions. Of course, there is a most delicate
balance to be struck between rearming the Arabs and being able to
restrain them from using these arms.
Perhaps there is hope for future arms control. It was reported
this October that Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko
had discussed the value of limiting the Middle East arms race, and had
agreed that each country would keep the other privately informed of
all arms shipments made to the area0
The Soviet draft resolution for
a peace-making framework presented to the Security Council in November
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did list the limiting of that arms race as an item to be negotiated,
while support by both the US and the USSR of the November 22 Britishsponsored Council resolution creating the Jarring mission has been a
rather positive sign of cooperation 0 although the resolution did not
specifically refer to arms control0
Perhaps most encouraging has been
the fact that President Johnson is said to have received a letter from
Premier Kosygin endorsing a proposal for agreement by the superpowers
limiting arms shipments to their Middle East allies.
Regardless of the policies pursued by the USSR and the US, the
role of other powers with interests in the Middle East cannot be
overlooked. President Nasser, who has always sought to follow an
independent course, has recently become concerned over Egypt's increased
dependence on the Soviet Union, and is seeking some sort of rapprochement
with the West. Not only is he seeking a resumption of diplomatic re-"
lations with the US, but ties have already been restored with Britain
and France. As has become clear, France has virtually switched sides
since 1956, and is strengthening her relations with the Arab nations.
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France has agreed in principle to widen economic and cultural ties
with Syria, the most bellicose of the Arab states, and has been granted
by Iraq an oil concession. France may sell to Iraq the fifty Mirage
fighters which were due to be delivered to Israel under a pre-war contract. China, of course, stands ready to supplant Soviet influence in
whatever way possible, and has already offered $10 million in lo-an and
grain aid to the Arabs. It is therefore apparent that, while the US
and the USSR can work out arrangements satisfactory to themselves, they
alone cannot determine the course of events in the area, although their
agreement to limit arms shipments and to engage in joint, parallel or
UN-sponsored development plans for the Middle East conditioned upon a
settlement with Israel might provide an important incentive for peace.
As for UN intervention, Article 2(3) of the Charter obligates all
members to "settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
Thus, although the Charter permits the Assembly 6 6 and the Council 6 7 to
recommend settlements, the focus is placed on the adversaries themselves making the peace, not the UN making it for them. Ambassador
Jarring is performing a significant function by acting as a line of
private communication while attempting to reconcile the positions of
the adversaries within the broad framework of the Council's resolution.
However, a "peace" that is not the result of direct negotiations will
likely tend to be makeshift in character and of doubtful permanence.
Just as peace-keeping can have a negative effect on peace-making,
so may makeshift peace-making be detrimental to the prospects of a
final settlement. Makeshift peace-making would involve solving the
problems of the Middle East on an issue-by-issue approach, such as
dealing with the rehabilitation of the refugees, allowing Israel to
use Aqaba and to send cargoes though not ships through Suez, and even
establishing demilitarized zones between Egypt and Israel, and Israel
and Jordan. This approach, would tend to relieve pressures without
solving the underlying problem of the failure of the Arab states
(including Syria, Iraq and the other Arab League nations) to accept
Israel's basic right to exist. Given the Arab intransigence on this
point, it may be that a makeshift peace is all that will emerge.
Although it is conceivable that such a peace might provide a basis for
limited cooperation, such as in the construction of atomic desalting
plants, and might lead to eventual Arab-Israeli total reconciliation,
this cannot be more than a gamble. After three wars, the odds are
against lasting success for this type of solution.
Since a stable peace, a permanent peace, can only be achieved
by a total settlem'ent, it is hoped that concerted international
efforts will be made in at least attempting to bring the parties
together in direct talks. There are, in addition, pressures operating
at present within the area which may bring about such talks. Israel
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is applying some pressure by taking the position that the longer the
Arabs wait to talk the less they will get. At the same time, Egypt
and especially Jordan are undergoing grave economic problems, and
they do not want to maintain an endless dependence on their wealthy
Arab neighbors which have thus far given the financial assistance to
prevent a more serious collapse. Israel must be willing to make
attractive concessions on the substantive issues. Thus, an ambitious
five-year development program which it recently proposed to solve the
refugee problem in the context of a general peace settlement, might
be one of many steps to be taken.
As long as the armaments picture is held in balance between the
Arabs and the Israelis, Israel's gains in the June war might just
provide the necessary leverage to make this the most auspicious time
to reach for a real peace.
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